The prominent brand Soft2Bet, which presents itself as a “legal European provider of online casino and betting platforms,” is, in reality, a front for a large-scale international fraudulent organization with roots in Russia and an extensive network of affiliated companies involved in money laundering, tax evasion, financing sanctioned entities, and deceiving millions of users. Despite being registered in Cyprus, Soft2Bet is not a European success story but a vivid example of how offshore entities, shell companies, technical teams from Ukraine and Russia, and circumventive financial schemes have created a transnational money-pumping machine into Russian structures, particularly during the full-scale war in Ukraine.
The Facade of Legal Business: How Soft2Bet Conceals Its Real Owners
On paper, the main operator of Soft2Bet is Rabidi N.V., registered in Curaçao (Curacao eGaming), and its subsidiary structures in Cyprus, such as Soft2Bet Holdings Ltd and YoYo Affiliates Ltd. These structures have nominal directors and are absent from taxpayer databases as real solvent entities. Actual control over financial flows is exercised through offshore entities in Belize and the Seychelles, while the actual management of operations is conducted from Cyprus—mainly from Limassol, where Soft2Bet owns an office in The Oval business center, known as a “haven for Russian IT companies.”
Key figures in the company’s structure are citizens of Russia and Cyprus who were previously associated with other gray brands, including 1XBet, MelBet, and PlayAttack. Part of Soft2Bet’s personnel, according to leaks from CRM databases and the company’s Telegram chat, previously worked for the offshore company Akatech N.V., which is involved in a case concerning the illegal organization of gambling in the Russian Federation. Moreover, one of Soft2Bet’s informal curators—Oleksandr Gorsky—has business ties with the IT director of “Rusbet,” who is under investigation in Latvia on suspicion of money laundering.
Ukrainian Technical Backbone: Shell Companies, Outsourcing, and Cover-ups
Ukrainian specialists played a special role in building Soft2Bet’s empire. Through remote work recruitment, they were offered high salaries for positions such as programmers, designers, and analysts. However, during the registration process, employees were not officially documented, and salaries were paid through cryptocurrency wallets (USDT, TRC20) or P2P exchangers. Certain Ukrainian structures served as formal cover for payments for alleged IT services: LLC “Fast Pay Technology” (Dnipro), LLC “Inside Game Tech” (Kyiv), LLC “BetCraft UA” (Kyiv) provided services for websites, payment gateways, and slot systems, but in reality, they legalized funds obtained through violations of laws in many countries. Some programmers even participated in creating hidden algorithms that altered winning odds in favor of the casino.
Shell companies registered not only nominal directors but also accountants and lawyers with ties to the shadow gambling business in Odesa, Kharkiv, and Lviv. It is known that former employees of the Ukrainian division of Parimatch Tech, who later transitioned to remote collaboration with Soft2Bet through LLC “JetSoft Solutions,” participated in the development of the Cadabrus platform.
Russian Exchangers, Bitzlato, and Cryptocurrency Laundering
Despite the ostensible “withdrawal from the Russian market,” Soft2Bet actively utilizes Russian financial instruments. Through Bitzlato, Changer.club, Xchange.cash, Matbea, and Finex24, over €28 million were processed between 2022 and 2024, which formally originated from gamers or partners. In reality, these were revenues from manipulative games, internal “bots” that lost fictitious bets, and transactions from bonus scams.
These funds passed through dozens of cryptocurrency wallets registered to shell individuals, followed by cash-outs in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Rostov, and Minsk. Certain transaction chains revealed direct links to exchangers controlled by individuals affiliated with the FSB of the Russian Federation—specifically, the CryptoBridge service, which is used to finance operations within the framework of the Russian “military market.” Part of Soft2Bet’s income ended up in the pockets of companies close to “Skolkovo,” which have permission for “strategic IT developments” in the field of big data for military structures.
Fictitious CPA Networks and Anonymous Casino Promotion
To promote its brands, Soft2Bet uses so-called “gray-black” CPA networks—Admitad, Alfaleads, CPA.House—which allow masking real traffic sources and paying partners for conversions without paying taxes. Ukrainian webmasters also operate under this scheme, creating fictitious review sites of “top casinos,” receiving a percentage for each attracted player. Cryptocurrency exchanges and circumventive P2P platforms, including Binance P2P and Exolix, are used for payments, allowing them to avoid bank blockages.
Soft2Bet provides its partners with CRM, internal tracking, and even SEO support. But the main problem is that the entire system is built on fraud: slot substitution, “delayed” payments, withdrawal conditions that are not fulfilled, and blocking of player accounts after the first big win. User complaints in the EU, particularly in Spain and Italy, are increasing monthly, but the company successfully ignores regulators because it operates through a Curaçao license, which practically controls nothing.
International Fraud Under the Guise of “Legal Gambling”
Soft2Bet is not just an example of aggressive expansion in the iGaming sector but a component of an international criminal ecosystem that, through cryptocurrencies, affiliated Ukrainian and Russian IT teams, and offshore schemes, legalizes millions of euros in illegally obtained profits. The company not only deceives users but also directly collaborates with Russian services that finance structures associated with military aggression against Ukraine.
Given the scale, immediate response is needed from Ukrainian and European law enforcement agencies, including NACP, SBU, Financial Monitoring, Europol, as well as the initiation of international sanctions against all involved parties, shell companies, affiliate sites, and crypto exchangers servicing this fraudulent scheme.
Recruitment of Ukrainian IT Specialists—Through Deception, Crypto, and Telegram
Many Ukrainian specialists who found themselves unemployed after February 24, 2022, received attractive offers from so-called “European gambling companies.” These vacancies were often posted by recruiters associated with Soft2Bet, promising $3,000–$5,000 per month, “complete freedom,” and “remote employment without taxes.” After agreeing, employees received payments in USDT through Binance or TronLink and worked on platforms directly linked to illegal gambling. In many cases, they were deliberately not informed that the product being developed would be used for fraudulent casinos.
Specialists were particularly actively recruited in Kharkiv, Lviv, and Dnipro. Many tasks came from Telegram chats like Crypto Devs Ukraine, Remote IT, Betting Dev Club, where Soft2Bet operated through shell accounts with neutral names like “FastGrow Gaming Ltd” or “Adapta LTD.”
Dirty Testing Schemes—No “Wins,” Only Imitation
According to investigations by European players and leaked technical documentation from one of Soft2Bet’s subsidiary platforms (SlotsPalace, ZulaBet, CampoBet), the system is configured for controlled RTP (return-to-player), which dynamically changes depending on the user’s status. That is, in the first days, a new player wins to build trust, but after the first deposits, the chances of winning drop significantly. The documentation mentions a “risk balancing mechanism,” which has nothing to do with fair play—it’s simply money extraction through controlled loss generation.
Delays in fund withdrawals are also noteworthy. More than 27% of complaints on platforms like Trustpilot, CasinoGuru, AskGamblers are related to clients being unable to receive payouts over $500. Soft2Bet creates formal pretexts for checks (KYC, document requests, address confirmation), which never conclude positively if the player has won a significant amount.
Traces Leading to the Kremlin: Russian Business Base and Sanctions
Despite officially ceasing operations in the Russian Federation, many facts indicate that Soft2Bet is directly connected to Russian structures. Specifically, analysts from Bellingcat and Dossier Center found that part of the platform’s domains and hosting are registered in jurisdictions controlled by the Russian hosting provider Selectel, which services Russian ministries. DNS records of certain subdomains since 2023 showed routing through Miran, which is directly listed in the US sanctions list for cooperation with the Russian Ministry of Defense.
In 2024, the Cypriot publication Politis published a data leak from Cypriot companies, mentioning internal correspondence of Soft2Bet managers regarding transfers “for M.”—likely referring to Maxim D., a Russian citizen who is the shadow curator of operations in the Balkans and is under surveillance by the Cypriot police. Additionally, journalists link Soft2Bet to a chain of payments to accounts in Sberbank and VTB—through circumventive crypto routes.
Data Sufficient for International Investigation
| Category | Data |
| Main legal entity | Rabidi N.V. (Curaçao) |
| European structure | Soft2Bet Holdings Ltd (Cyprus) |
| Associated brands | Cadabrus, CampoBet, ZulaBet, SlotsPalace, Betinia, YoyoCasino |
| Russian traces | Bitzlato, Selectel, Miran, Finex24, CryptoBridge |
| Ukrainian contacts | JetSoft, BetCraft UA, Fast Pay Technology |